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THE COMPETITIVE PERCEPTION
Joa˜o Tiago Lima
This paper aims to define what competitive perception is. Using Dufrenne’s phenomenological
analysis of the art spectator’s experience, namely the concept of aesthetic perception, I will claim
that it is useful to apply this phenomenological approach to the experience of watching sport
events. I will argue that the concepts of uncertainty and auto teleology, being two main features
in sport competition, are helpful to define competitive perception.
Resumen
Este artı´culo tiene como objetivo el definir la nocio´n de ‘‘percepcio´n competitiva’’ [competitive
perception; en el sentido de percepcio´n de la competicio´n]. Utilizando el ana´lisis fenomenolo´gico
de Dufrenne en cuanto a la experiencia del arte por parte del espectador, en concreto el concepto
de la percepcio´n este´tica, argumentare´ que es u´til el aplicar este enfoque fenomenolo´gico a la
experiencia que se da al presenciar eventos deportivos. Argu¨ire´ que los conceptos de la
incertidumbre y la ‘‘auto-teleologı´a’’, siendo e´stos los dos aspectos principales en la competicio´n
deportiva, son utiles para de´finir la percepcio´n competitiva.
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Artikel beabsichtigt, den Begriff Wettkampfwahrnehmung zu definieren. Mit Dufrennes
pha¨nomenologischer Analyse des Erlebens von Kunstbetrachtern, d. h. dem Konzept der
a¨sthetischen Wahrnehmung, werde ich darlegen, dass es sinnvoll ist, diesen pha¨nomenologischen
Ansatz auf das Erleben beim Zuschauen von Sportveranstaltungen anzuwenden. Ich werde zeigen,
dass die Konzepte Unsicherheit und Autoteleologie zwei wesentliche Aspekte im sportlichen
Wettkampf hilfreich sind, um Wettkampfwahrnehmung zu definieren.
Re´sume´
Cet article aspire a` de´finir la perception compe´titive. En utilisant l’analyse phe´nome´nologique de
Dufrenne sur l’expe´rience du spectateur d’art, a` savoir le concept de perception esthe´tique, je
pre´tends qu’il est utile d’appliquer cette approche phe´nome´nologique a` l’expe´rience du spectacle
sportif. Je soutiendrai que les concepts d’incertitude et d’auto-te´le´ologie, deux caracte´ristiques
principales de la compe´tition sportive, aident a` de´finir la perception compe´titive.
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1. Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to define competitive perception. It does so by
focusing upon the implications of Dufrenne’s philosophy beyond the aesthetic
experience, namely his analysis of the spectator’s experience. Mikel Dufrenne (1910–
1995) developed a philosophical methodology from a phenomenological matrix. Using
The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (published in Paris in 1953) as a starting
point, and Dufrenne’s distinction between the aesthetic object and the work of art, I will
argue that it is possible to apply this phenomenological approach to the experience of
watching sport events.
I must begin by highlighting that Dufrenne’s main concern was not to study art’s
audience from a sociological point of view. Instead, Dufrenne shows how the work of art
becomes an aesthetic object only when it is perceived by a specific recipient. According to
Dufrenne, the work of art itself is not enough for perceiving an aesthetic object. He claims
that the work of art is merely that which has the potential to be perceived aesthetically.
Thus, the work of art demands an aesthetic perception from the spectator to become an
aesthetic object. Could these methodological tools, used by Dufrenne to define the
aesthetic experience, help us approach other human experiences such as watching sport?
Sport is a great and global spectacle. There are several researchers who study
sporting audiences from a sociological standpoint. Nevertheless my aim is different,
because I attempt to apply what Dufrenne calls the aesthetic perception to sport spectator
perception. Therefore, this paper introduces the concept of competitive perception in order
to describe the specificity of the sport watching experience. It must be emphasised that
competitive perception and watching sports are not the same experience. We can watch a
sports event without a competitive perception of it.
According to Jerome Stolnitz, ‘we cannot understand modern aesthetic theory
unless we understand the concept of disinterestedness’ (Stolnitz 1961, 131). Stolnitz
emphasises the disinterestedness of the aesthetic experience because in this kind of
experience there is no concern for ulterior purpose. Eliseo Vivas defines the aesthetic
experience as an intransitive experience and shows us how a sports event can be
aesthetically perceived:
Having once seen a hockey game in slow motion, I am prepared to testify that it was an
object of pure intransitive experience – for I was not interested in which team won the
game and no external factors mingled with my interest in the beautiful rhythmic flow of
the slow-moving men. (Vivas 1959, 228).


































The competitive perception can certainly be analysed in sports (synchronised
swimming, artistic gymnastics, figure skating, for example) similar to dance, theatre or the
performative arts in general. However, the focus of this paper is not to consider the so
called aesthetic sports or even the beautiful sports, given the difficulty of achieving a
consensus about these and other similar categories.
When we talk about aesthetic sports, we are always thinking of beautiful sports. Isn’t it true
that is very hard to evaluate what is beauty? That the concept of beauty is very
controversial? What are beautiful sports and non beautiful sports? What are beautiful
sports and ugly sports? Can we sustain, in theoretical terms, that the purposive sports
don’t have aesthetic qualities? That their movements or their actions don’t show any
beauty? (Marques 1993, 35).
Instead, this study concentrates on the competitive perception in those sports events
where the members of the audience usually encourage and support their athletes or their
teams. Our focus of concern is on sports such as tennis, football, basketball or rugby,
where two players or two teams compete against each other and the audience follows the
match from stadium seats or even from TV.
Vivas’s example proves we can watch every sport event for aesthetic reasons only,
but this paper’s main concern is to describe other peculiar experiences by answering to
the following questions: What really happens that makes us feel and act as if we were
the 12th player in a football match? What really happens that makes people laugh and
cry, dance and bite their nails or support and insult the players, the coach and the
referees during a match? These are the most important issues and the ones I would like
to study in this paper. But firstly I wish to return to Dufrenne’s definition of aesthetic
experience.
2. Dufrenne’s Definition of Aesthetic Experience
There is a lack of consensus about the concept of aesthetic experience or aesthetic
attitude even if the two concepts are not exactly synonymous. George Dickie maintains
that ‘the aesthetic attitude is a myth and . . . is no longer useful and in fact misleads
aesthetic theory’ (Dickie 1964, 56). Dickie also points out that it is widely acknowledge
‘that the notion of the aesthetic attitude has played an important role in the freeing of
aesthetic theory from an overweening concern with beauty’ (ibid., 64).
I believe that Dufrenne’s definition of aesthetic experience is very helpful for this
paper’s aim. Dufrenne begins by distinguishing the work of art from aesthetic perception.
But what is a work of art? Dufrenne argues that ‘the work of art is whatever is recognized
and held up as such for our approval» (Dufrenne 1973 [cited hereafter as PhAE], lvii). By
defining the work of art in these terms, Dufrenne (at least in The Phenomenology of
Aesthetic Experience) accepts a work of art’s conservative view. On the other hand, for him,
it’s also possible to consider an aesthetic perception apart from the work of art’s
experience, by watching a natural phenomenon, for example. Anyway, for methodological
reasons, Dufrenne sets aside definitional problems surrounding a work of art. Thus he
considers the aesthetic experience in terms of the experience of the work of art. But what
about the aesthetic perception? According to Dufrenne it’s the only perception that does



































concert, je suis en face de l’orchestre, mais je suis dans la symphonie]’ (PhAE, 56). Between me
and the music, there is a reciprocal possession, because music’s physical presence is
something we experience pre-reflectively, bodily.
Within the work of art (e.g. a symphony or a painting), there are two possibilities:
(a) We can perceive it as if it was an ordinary object of use, but this kind of perception
doesn’t do justice to the work of art.
(b) We can perceive it aesthetically and only in this case we do justice to the work of art
by giving it a special treatment, as when we are inside the symphony. ‘The work of art is
what is left of the aesthetic object when it is not perceived’ (PhAE, 14).
And that’s another important distinction: unlike other objects (e.g. the cognitive object)
that does not need to be present to be part of the correlation with a subject that perceives
it, the aesthetic object needs to be attested by a perception. I can describe a historical fact, a
mathematical concept or a philosophical question without its physical presence, but I can’t
replace the opera’s aesthetic experience by its narrative. Therefore the reciprocal
possession between the aesthetic object (work of artþ aesthetic perception) and the
recipient shows that the aesthetic object needs the recipient (spectator or audience).
There are many forms of art. In this case, I will only talk about the performative
arts (music, theatre or dance), because it’s easier to compare the role players in those
activities with sports such as football, rugby or tennis. If we consider theatre, dance or
music, the audience’s presence and even the audience’s collaboration is undeniable.
Dufrenne claims that in a concert ‘it is at least left for the audience to collaborate in the
performance by forming a backdrop of pure silence, a human silence charged with
attention’ (PhAE, 49).
Dufrenne recalls that we say that a concert at an empty theatre is a sort of sad
concert. And can we imagine an exhibition at a museum with no visitors or a book with no
readers? Can we say the same about a competition that takes place in an empty stadium?
However, it seems obvious that in some contemporary art experiences the
audience’s participation is definitely more important. Dufrenne says that
these new works of art demand a stronger audience commitment on the aesthetic
experience; instead of keeping the distance . . . and requiring a passive and ceremonial
audience contemplation, they ask . . . for the audience’s participation. . . . Dionysus
defeats Apollo and the party begins, the spectators become players, the reception
becomes a co-creation. (Dufrenne 1976, 285)
Is it the same for a sport event? Let’s compare an orchestra with a rugby team. We
can say that rugby players work as an ensemble like the members of an orchestra do. We
can say that, in a rugby match, neither team needs the audience for doing its job. We can
say that they’re playing only for themselves. They receive support or even hostility from
the audience, but they can play in an empty stadium. Can’t they? What about those
Olympic competitors who rouse up the audiences before their run-up in high jump, the
long jump or triple jump? Surely, this behaviour is to get spectators to add something to
their performance.
In tennis competitions the audience must watch the players in silence during the
match: when a match is disrupted or interfered with by the action of a spectator who is


































part of the player’s entourage, the official first warns the player, including advising that any
further interference may result in his own disqualification. Therefore, we can say, using
Dufrenne’s words, that in tennis it is at least left for the audience to collaborate in the
performance by forming a backdrop of pure silence. But in other sports, what’s the
audience’s role in the competition?
3. What is Competitive Perception?
As I said before, competitive perception and watching sports are different concepts.
We can watch a sports event without a competitive perception of it. For instance, some
politicians go to stadiums mainly to be seen rather than to watch the sport event and
consequently with no ulterior purpose or disinterestedly (Stolnitz 1961). Those politicians
are acting out of self-interest. However, it must be said that, sometimes, other politicians
behave as genuine fans. For instance, the Italian president, Alessandro Pertini, celebrated
the Squadra Azurra goals against Germany during the 1982 World Cup Final as a genuine
tifoso. He jumped and howled like a child, but he was 86 years old. There’s no doubt that
he was living a competitive perception and he didn’t act to be seen by others. I believe he
was watching disinterestedly a football match.
Sı´lvio Lima, a Portuguese sports philosopher, wrote in 1938, these words: ‘The game
or the sport competition has his own aims. It’s autoteleological. The player doesn’t have an
external aim’ (Lima 2002, 967). In other terms, the player plays because he wants to and
that will doesn’t surpass the game itself. The sports player doesn’t seek an audience. But if
these arguments are good, we must ask again: what’s the audience’s role in a sport
competition?
There’s another dimension in sport competition besides the so-called autoteleological
dimension. Before a game starts, nobody knows the final score. There’s uncertainty and that’s
essential to sport watching and even to sport competition. If, for any reason, I can’t watch the
game live on TV and if I want to watch it later, I would prefer not to know the final score. If I
already know the final score, I can watch a game from a purely aesthetic standpoint (see
Viva’s example), but in that case I would not be able to have a competitive perception. That’s
why we can enjoy watching the Borg vs McEnroe Wimbledon tennis final, the Manchester
United vs Bayern Mu¨nchen Champions League final in 1999 or the 1973 Barbarians try
against the All Blacks rugby team. Yet in those experiences we don’t feel the uncertainty.
Before watching we know in advance how the story ends. In those experiences, we don’t do
justice to the sport competition. Therefore, we don’t have a competitive perception.
Very often the sport spectator wants to be a part of the competition. That’s the
reason why he wears his team clothes. Usually, we say the audience is the 12th player of a
football team. And sometimes the audience interferes in a competition decision. As we
said before, there are sports (like tennis) that don’t allow this kind of interference for
ethical reasons. On the other hand, several contemporary art experiences demand
audience participation. In those cases, one expects the audience to become one of the
players. According to Dufrenne, the reception becomes a co-creation.
In a sense, we could argue that the competitive perception in tennis is more closely
related to the aesthetic perception of the classical works of art (a passive and ceremonial
audience contemplation). But even in tennis, things keep changing. For instance, in the Davis
Cup (a competition that is similar to the football or rugby World Cup) it’s very hard to avoid



































less absurd than the football fan who shut his eyes before a penalty kick. Although he can’t
see anything there’s no doubt he’s experiencing a competitive perception. He plays as if he
was a team member. In a similar way, the team coach acts as an orchestra conductor and
directs the players from the bench. Both the fan and the coach have a competitive
perception, but they can also applaud a goal scored by the opposite team from an aesthetic
standpoint. In some countries this kind of behaviour can be very dangerous, but still it isn’t
impossible. This happens when aesthetic perception takes over competitive perception.
4. Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to discuss the implications of the Dufrenne’s philosophy
beyond the aesthetic experience, especially in his analysis of the spectator’s experience. I
have started with Dufrenne’s definition of aesthetic experience and then I have tried to
make an analogy between the sport spectator’s experience and the art spectator’s
experience. It is my belief that sports competition offers two main features:
(a) the autoteleological dimension;
(b) the uncertainty.
This paper also claims that aesthetic perception and competitive perception aren’t
the same, even if there are similarities in them. In either case, the sports philosopher can
certainly find here some of the most curious human behaviour.
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